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SMOKIN’!  MODIFICATION IN BOOMTOWN:  WHEN 
BUSINESS IS BOOMING, LOOK TO THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF AN 
INSTANT MESSAGE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT 
CX DIGITAL MEDIA, INC. V. SMOKING EVERYWHERE, INC. 
CHRISTYNE J. VACHON* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The oil boom in western North Dakota is also causing a boom in many 
other businesses.  With business booming, deals are being made and 
changed rapidly to keep up with the pace.  Consequently, if instant 
messages were determined to not be oral communications, and could lead to 
modification of a contract with a no-oral modifications clause, this would 
draw attention.  This Article analyzes the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida’s decision in CX Digital Media, Inc. v. 
Smoking Everywhere, Inc. that concluded, under the common law, instant 
messages modified a contract with a no-oral modifications clause.  Instant 
messaging is a commonly used method of communicating with one’s 
business network; thus, the implications of the CX Digital Media decision 
could be far reaching.  This Article further examines the impact of the CX 
Digital Media decision in the context of the sale of goods under the 
Uniform Commercial Code’s Article 2 in North Dakota’s boomtown.  The 
Article concludes by approving of the reliability and flexibility that the CX 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Holy cow, I didn’t think it would happen this fast . . . .”1 
 
In North Dakota, the towns of Dickinson and Williston are the seat of 
the oil boom that is rapidly transforming the western part of the state.2  Oil 
workers are flocking to the two towns, causing rents to soar, temporary 
housing to be thrown together, man camps to spring up, fast-food outlets 
and over-priced motels to dot the landscape, and construction sites to 
appear like – well – oil rigs on a North Dakota prairie.3  In the 1950s and 
1980s, the Williston Basin was also the site of two previous oil surges in 
 
1. Statement by Ron Ness, President of the North Dakota Petroleum Council; see also 
Stephen J. Lee, Step Aside Alaskas, N.D. No. 2 for Oil Production, GRAND FORKS HERALD, May 
15, 2012, at A2.  The North Dakota Petroleum Council is a nonprofit trade group that is nearing 
400 member companies, an increase from about 160 members five years ago.  Id. 
2. Peter Gorrie, Trip Through Oil Country in a Fuel Miser:  Prius v a Fine Choice for Long-
Distance Trek in Western Badlands, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 8, 2012, at W23. 
3. Id.; see also Jim Mackinnon, PBS Examines Tradeoffs in Developing North Dakota’s 
Bakken Shale, AKRON BEACON J. (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.ohio.com/blogs/drilling/ 
ohio-utica-shale-1.291290/pbs-examines-tradeoffs-in-developing-north-dakota-s-bakken-shale-1.3 
26171 (indicating that “unemployment is well below the national average and where people come 
from other states to find a job”). 
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North Dakota, but the spread was relatively contained.4 With the advances 
in technology, today’s oil boom is much more widespread, affecting almost 
all of western and part of northern North Dakota.5 
The extreme economic effect of the latest oil boom was described by 
Williston’s Mayor Ward Koeser in the spring of 2012:  “The average 
annual salary in 2006 for Williston was $31,956.  The annual salary now 
averages $71,000 a year.”6  Alongside the increase in salary, the Williston 
population has shot up.7  Earlier this year Mayor Koeser explained, 
[a]ccording to the United States census for 2000, the population of 
Williston was 12,500 . . . .  The 2010 census put Williston at 
17,000.  It is now estimated to be 20,000 to 25,000 . . . .  If you 
include what the 2010 census says along with the temporary 
workers, we have close to 30,000 people here.8 
It is not surprising then that, in the words of Ron Ness, Director of the 
North Dakota Petroleum Council:  “Infrastructure can’t grow fast enough to 
meet the demand of business.”9  Development in Dickinson and Williston 
has surged as a result of the oil boom.10  Between January to March of 
2012, Williston set a record for building permits’ values11 at over $33.55 
million.12  The town of Dickinson recorded building permit total values at 
almost $36.11 million for the month of March 2012 alone.13  With an oil 
boom and the corresponding development of infrastructure to support the 
 
4. Clay Jenkinson, OK, Here’s Where You Draw the Line, BISMARCK TRIB., May 5, 2012, at 
C1. 
5. Id. 
6. Kevin Brant, Seeing the Impact:  Members of ND Legislative Council Meet in Williston, 





9. Id. (“The lack of infrastructure makes it hard to keep up with the demand of businesses 
and housing.  Many companies will do what it takes to get employees, even if it means housing 
them in temporary camps.”). 
10. April Baumgarten, Dickinson Issues Building Permits Worth More in 1 Month than 
Williston Does in 3 Months, DICKINSON PRESS (May 6, 2012), http://www.thedickinson 
press.com/event/article/id/57812/ (citing to code enforcement reports) (quoting Kelly Aberle, 
office manager and plans examiner of the Williston Building Department). 
11. Values include buildings, additions and alterations.  Id. 
12. Id. (citing to code enforcement reports). 
13. Id.  “Based upon contacts from the developers and from property owners and companies 
outside of it, Dickinson is a city that a lot of people want to do business in and reside in.”  Id. 
(quoting Dickinson City Planner Ed Courton). 
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oil boom, lawyers will be busy crafting, among other things, contracts, and 
parties, no doubt, will need to reach agreement fast and frequently.14 
Meanwhile, in Florida, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida rendered a decision in CX Digital Media, Inc. v. 
Smoking Everywhere, Inc.,15 concluding that a contract with a no-oral 
modifications clause (a NOM) had been modified by instant messaging.16  
While this is an unpublished district court decision, CX Digital provides 
guidance on the treatment of contract modification that embodies the right 
balance of rigidity and flexibility.17  When business is booming in North 
Dakota and the infrastructure is barely able to keep up, people will be 
communicating with each other in the most accessible and fastest means 
available.  Instant messaging is at the forefront of the fast communication.18  
Instant messaging is a commonly used method of communicating with 
one’s business network: buyers, sellers, distributors, contractors – and the 
list goes on.19  Thus, the implications for the CX Digital decision could be 
far reaching. 
This Article explores the ramifications of the CX Digital decision in the 
context of the general law of contracts and law of contracts for the sale of 
goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).20  This Article finds 
that, in light of the CX Digital decision, an Article 2 analysis of 
modification is more complex than under a common law analysis.21  This is 
true, most particularly, because of the complexity and lack of clarity of 
section 2-209, the modification section, of the U.C.C., and the recognition 
under Article 2 of NOM clauses.22  After wading through the U.C.C., this 
Article concludes that the CX Digital decision provides the right direction 
for contract modification in both the law of contracts and law of contracts 
for the sale of goods.23  The decision balances the concerns for reliability 
 
14. See, e.g., Jacquie McNish, Oil and Gas Lawyer Extends Reach Beyond Borders, GLOBE 
& MAIL, May 10, 2016, at B9 (referring to lawyers inundated with work in the Calgary oil boom). 
15. No. 09-62020-CIV, 2011 WL 1102782 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2011).  It is noted that this 
case is a district court decision and applies the general law of contract. 
16. CX Digitial Media, Inc., 2011 WL 1102782, at *12. 
17. See generally id. 
18. J.D. Biersdorfer, No Hype:  Four Web Tools that Work and Save Money; to Nail the Sale, 
E-mail’s too Slow, NY TIMES, June 13, 2001, at H3 (“[T]he very thing that makes instant 
messaging so useful at home – namely fast communication – makes it equally valuable as a 
business tool.”); Jennifer Brown, Five Ways to Grow in Any Economy:  Learn to Keep Your 
Company Moving Even When Things Are Stagnant, DAILY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.dailynews.lk/2010/01/04/bus49.asp. 
19. Biersdorfer, supra note 18, at H3. 
20. See infra Part III. 
21. See id. 
22. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (2012). 
23. See infra Part IV. 
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and flexibility of contracting by using an analysis of the actual business 
environments to reach a determination. This approach is consistent with the 
direction of the general law of contracts and the legislative intent of the 
U.C.C. 
Consistent with the common law of contracts, the CX Digital decision 
promotes the flexibility in contracting that would encourage economic 
growth, yet the reliability that does not reward a party for taking advantage 
of the performance based on reliance of another party.  The law of Article 2 
of the U.C.C. creates a mixture of flexibility and rigidity (and, perhaps, 
confusion).  Pursuant to section 1-103(b) of the U.C.C., courts may apply 
common law when the U.C.C. provisions are silent and ambiguous.24  
Noting that the U.C.C. is silent as to whether instant messages may modify 
a contract and, the case law interpreting Article 2 provides no specific 
guidance, a court may consult other law in other jurisdictions for 
guidance.25  In addition, and perhaps more important, section 2-209 of the 
U.C.C. governs modification and has been a source of confusion.26  Courts 
have applied differing analyses under the section and have reached differing 
conclusions.  The CX Digital decision assists to provide clarity to 
modification under section 2-209. 
The first consideration, as mentioned, is that section 1-103 of the 
U.C.C. directs a court to consult general principles of law to supplement the 
provisions of the U.C.C.27  The result is that courts refer to common law, 
such as the CX Digital decision, and other statutes to guide the 
interpretation of ambiguities or gaps in the U.C.C.28  In general, a court may 
fill the U.C.C. ambiguities or gaps by application of existing common law 
or by creating new common law.29 
The second consideration for a court, when interpreting an ambiguous 
part of the U.C.C. or a gap, is to consider the legislative intent of the U.C.C.  
Article 2 of the U.C.C provides that, with regards to contract modifications, 
the U.C.C. seeks “to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable 
modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at 
present hamper such adjustments.”30  Section 1-102(1) requires, “[t]his Act 
 
24. U.C.C. § 1-103. 
25. Id. 
26. U.C.C. § 2-209. 
27. Gregory E. Maggs, Patterns of Drafting Errors in the Uniform Commercial Code and 
How Courts Should Respond to Them, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 81, 100 (2002). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 105 (referencing in the context of circular definitions of cross-references). 
30. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a); U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt.1; see also, Douglass K. Newell, Cleaning up 
U.C.C. Section 2-209, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 487, 488 (1991) (describing U.C.C. section 1-102(2)(a); 
U.C.C. section 2-209 cmt. 1 (1989)). 
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shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying 
purposes . . . .”31  Section 1-102 identifies clear underlying purposes and 
policies of the U.C.C.:  “(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law 
governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion 
of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the 
parties; (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”32 
These three parameters of Section 1-102 provide guidance to courts 
confronted with ambiguous U.C.C. terms and gaps.33  In particular, 
parameter (c) implies the important concept that courts should follow 
precedent from other jurisdictions in order to promote uniformity.34  
Consistent with this approach, a court in North Dakota is strongly advised 
to follow the precedent of other jurisdictions, including Florida, when 
considering whether an instant message exchange modified a contract.35 
II. CX DIGITAL MEDIA, INC. V. SMOKING EVERYWHERE, INC. 
 
pedramcx [Pedram Soltani] (10:22:00 AM):  good morning Nick! 
 
 pedramcx (10:22:23 AM):  Have you placed the pixels for the two new 
 pages?36 
 
And thus begins the instant message communication that is the subject 
of the CX Digital37 decision.38  This case provides clear guidance into when 
an instant message exchange may modify the underlying contract under the 
general law of contracts.  In this breach of contract action, the Canadian 
advertising company, CX Digital Media, Inc., claimed the defendant, a 
Florida-based electronic cigarette distributor, Smoking Everywhere, Inc.,39 
 
31. U.C.C. § 1-102(1). 
32. U.C.C. § 1-102(1)-(2); see Maggs, supra note 27, at 102-03 (citing U.C.C. § 1-102(1)-
(2)). 
33. Maggs, supra note 27, at 103. 
34. Id.  “Although factors (a) and (b) provide some guidance, few courts would want to 
complicate the law or inhibit commercial development even if such factors were expressly stated 
in § 1-102(2).”  Id. 
35. Given the concept of legislative supremacy, this argues against a textualist approach to 
the U.C.C.  Clearly, the drafters of the U.C.C. sought to improve upon existing common law and 
provide flexibility and uniformity.  U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a). 
36. CX Digital Media, Inc. v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., No. 09-62020-CIV, 2011 WL 
1102782, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2011). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Note that Smoking Everywhere, Inc. is no stranger to legal issues.  The company has 
been the defendant in class action lawsuits for misrepresentation of the safety of its smoking 
products as a healthier alternative to traditional cigarettes.  See E-Cigarette Vendor Bailed on 
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failed to pay fees amounting to more than $1.36 million.40  CX Digital 
claimed in 2009, Smoking Everywhere secured its services to use CX 
Digital’s network of affiliates to offer free trials of its products.41  CX 
Digital linked customers to Smoking Everywhere’s web pages to register 
for the free trial.42  If the customers did not cancel the trial and return the 
trial kit, they were charged by Smoking Everywhere for the products.43  The 
plaintiff claimed that on August 4, 2009, Smoking Everywhere agreed to 
pay CX Digital $45 for each customer that registered for the free trial offer 
and that on September 14, 2009, Smoking Everywhere agreed to an 
increase to $51 for each customer.44  CX Digital maintained that Smoking 
Everywhere ignored CX Digital’s invoices for $25,150 in August, and $1.3 
million in September.45 
In January 2011, the case was tried over five days.46  The court 
described CX Digital’s business as serving as “a middleman between its 
network[s] of affiliates . . . on the internet, and businesses that want to 
advertise online.”47  CX Digital would enter into an agreement, an 
“Insertion Order”, with a new business client, like Smoking Everywhere, 
and then work with the client to design a campaign, including the web 
pages.48  In the campaign, each advertisement could be clicked on by a 
client’s customer.49  Once the customer clicked on the advertisement, the 
technology allowed tracking of what the customer did and, thereby, how 
much CX Digital’s client owed CX Digital for customers directed to 
client’s web pages.50  For each completed sale by the client’s customers, 
CX Digital owed a fee to its affiliate that referred the customer.51  CX 
Digital paid its affiliates on a weekly basis, despite not having received 
payment from its own client, Smoking Everywhere.52 
The court concluded that Smoking Everywhere, “approached 
[p]laintiff, CX Digital Media, Inc., about a free-trial offer that Smoking 
 
$1.36 Million Bill, Advertiser Says, ANDREWS TOBACCO INDUS. LITIG. REP., Jan. 15, 2010, at 1 
[hereinafter E-Cigarette Vendor Bailed]. 
40. Id. 
41. CX Digital Media, Inc., 2011 WL 1102782, at *1. 
42. Id. at *2. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at *5. 
45. Id. at *2; see also E-Cigarette Vendor Bailed, supra note 39, at 1. 
46. CX Digital Media, Inc., 2011 WL 1102782, at *2. 
47. Id. at *1. 
48. Id. at *2-3. 
49. Id. at *1. 
50. Id. at *2-3. 
51. Id. at *2. 
52. Id. at *2-3. 
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Everywhere wanted to promote.”53  As the court determined, pursuant to the 
Smoking Everywhere Insertion Order during August 2009, CX Digital 
directed 670 sales to Smoking Everywhere.54  During that time, on any 
given day, CX Digital did not direct more than 200 sales.55  For example, 
during the period from August 13, 2009 to August 31, 2009, CX Digital 
directed an average number of sales per day of 39 to Smoking 
Everywhere.56  In turn, CX Digital sent an invoice to Smoking Everywhere 
for $25,150 for the 670 sales in August.57  This amount on the invoice 
reflected a $5000 deduction for a deposit that Smoking Everywhere had 
already made.58  Although the payment for the August invoice was due on 
September 15, 2009, Smoking Everywhere never paid the bill.59 
On September 2, 2009, Nick Touris, the vice president of advertising 
from Smoking Everywhere, and Pedram Soltani, an account manager at CX 
Digital, engaged in an instant message exchange covering a number of 
topics, including the operation of “two new pages,”60 and whether CX 
Digital would send “2000 orders/day by Friday.”61  CX Digital claims the 
instant message conversation amounted to a memorialization of a 
modification of the original agreement, the Insertion Order, between CX 
Digital and Smoking Everywhere.62 
Touris and Soltani had an instant message exchange about switching 
the Smoking Everywhere web page to which CX Digital was to direct the 
customers.63  As the court stated, “[t]he conversation began with a long, 
technical discussion about switching away from the ecig.smoking 
everywhere.com link . . . .  Touris had difficulty receiving the pixel by 
email, so Soltani sent it to him by instant message, and then the 
conversation continued with Touris complaining . . . .” about the testing and 
process in an effort to get it done correctly.64  An example of a section of 
 







60. Id.  After this exchange, Touris and Soltani then entered into an exchange about 
removing the 1-800 phone number from one of Smoking Everywhere’s web pages.  Additionally, 
Soltani offered that CX Digital could re-code some of Smoking Everywhere’s pages.  Id. at *3.  
When the recoding was finished, CX Digital sent the pages back to Smoking Everywhere for 
uploading.  Id.  Then an instant message exchange occurred about switching the page.  Id. at *2-3. 
61. Id. at *2. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at *3. 
64. Id. at *2-3. 
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the exchange, where Touris and Soltani try to correct problems with linking 
to the two new pages is as follows: 
 
nicktouris (2:09:32 PM): 
http://www.incentaclick.com/click/mc973327df/test_ 6562/ is taking me to 
ecig 
 
nicktouris (2:11:48 PM):  when I type it in it take me to the old ecig page 
 
pedramcx (2:12:04 PM):  yeah . . . sorry give me a second 
 
pedramcx (2:12:08 PM):  I guess it didn’t save it 
 
pedramcx (2:12:14 PM):  let me switch the link again 
 
pedramcx (2:12:15 PM):  one sec 
 
pedramcx (2:13:07 PM):  done 
 
pedramcx (2:13:16 PM):  send the tests 
 
nicktouris (2:19:34 PM):  sent65 
 
As the court would rightfully note later, the level of trouble-shooting 
engaged in by Touris on behalf of Smoking Everywhere cooperatively with 
CX Digital makes it very hard to imagine that Smoking Everywhere had not 
agreed to switch to the two new pages.66  In addition, consider the fact that, 
days later, Touris of Smoking Everywhere further complained about the 
content of the new pages and worked with CX Digital in an effort to get 
better functionality.67 
Immediately following the instant message exchange about switching 
to the two new pages, Soltani of CX Digital began a conversation about 
increasing the number of customer sales it was directing to Smoking 
Everywhere.68  The following is an excerpted section of the instant message 
exchange that the court highlighted: 
 
65. Id. at *3. 
66. Id. at *10. 
67. On September 10, 2009, “Touris complained that he had come across one site that had 
the wrong terms and was ‘advertising [the offer] as FREE.’”  Id. at *4 (citing Def.’s Trial Ex. 6-1) 
(alteration in original). 
68. Id. at *3. 
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pedramcx (2:49:45 PM):  A few of our big guys are really excited about the 
new page and they’re ready to run it 
 
pedramcx (2:50:08 PM):  We can do 2000 orders/day by Friday if I have 
your blessing 
 
pedramcx (2:50:39 PM):  You also have to find some way to get the Sub 
IDs working 
 
pedramcx (2:52:13 PM):  those 2000 leads are going to be generated by our 
best affiliate and he’s legit 
 
nicktouris is available (3:42:42 PM):  I am away from my computer right 
now. 
 
pedramcx (4:07:57 PM):  And I want the AOR when we make your offer # 
1 on the network 
 
nicktouris (4:43:09 PM):  NO LIMIT 
 
pedramcx (4:43:21 PM):  awesome!69 
 
The same day, September 2, CX Digital began to substantially increase the 
number of sales sent to Smoking Everywhere.70  “Between September 2, 
2009 and September 23, 2009, CX Digital sent an average of 1,244 Sales 
per day, with a peak of 2,896 Sales on September 22, 2009.”71  When 
Smoking Everywhere had not paid the August invoice by September 23 or 
24, CX Digital stopped directing customer sales to its pages.72  As of the 
date of the CX Digital decision, Smoking Everywhere had not paid either 
the August or September CX Digital invoices.  While CX Digital 
acknowledges that Smoking Everywhere paid a $5000 deposit, Smoking 
Everywhere had not paid the full amount CX Digital claimed it was owed.73 
 
69. Id. at *3-4. 
70. Id. at *4. 
71. Id. 
72. Id.  The court clarified that there was no dispute that CX Digital fulfilled its obligations 
under the Insertion Order during August 2009, providing fewer than 200 sales per day to Smoking 
Everywhere.  Id. at *5.  There also was no dispute that in August CX Digital directed all of the 
consumer traffic to Smoking Everywhere to the pages listed in the Insertion Order.  Id. 
73. Id. at *2. 
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In its complaint, CX Digital alleged breach of contract and sought 
compensatory damages and attorney’s fees.74  The defendant, Smoking 
Everywhere, argued it should not have to pay the amounts claimed by CX 
Digital because the company, among other things, breached the Insertion 
Order by directing more than the Insertion Order’s allotted 200 sales per 
day to Smoking Everywhere and by sending the sales traffic to web pages 
other than those identified in the Insertion Order.75  CX Digital argued that, 
while it did engage in this conduct, the conduct was consistent with the 
modified Insertion Order.76  CX Digital urged that the instant message 
exchange between Touris and Soltani on September 2, 2009 modified the 
Insertion Order in two ways.77  First, it switched the Smoking Everywhere 
web pages to which CX Digital was supposed to send the customer sales 
traffic; and, second, it eliminated the limit on customer sales per day 
directed to Smoking Everywhere.78 
Thus, the determination of whether or not there was a breach of 
contract by CX Digital depended on whether there was “an enforceable 
modification to the Insertion Order” that allowed for CX Digital to direct an 
unlimited number of leads to the “two new pages . . . .”79  Thus, the 
questions the court sought to answer were:  (1) did Touris and Soltani agree 
to modify the Insertion Order during their September 2, 2009, instant 
message exchange; and, if so, (2) is their agreement to modify the Insertion 
Order enforceable?80  The court analyzed the instant message exchange 
under the lens of the general law of contract, noting that the law of 
Delaware governed the analysis of the Insertion Order because the Insertion 
Order so provided, and the parties had so agreed.81  The court conducted its 
analysis of (a) the change from the old to the “two new pages” and (b) the 
elimination of the limit separately.82  In addition, the court provided 
analysis of the effect of the no-oral modifications clause in the Insertion 
Order and whether or not consideration was required and adequate.83 
 
74. Id. at *5. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at *6. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at *6-7. 
80. Id. at *6. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at *7. 
83. Id. at *10. 
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A. CHANGE TO THE “TWO NEW PAGES” 
To determine whether or not the Insertion Order had been modified to 
include the “two new pages,” the court provided legal analysis of contract 
formation pursuant to common law.84  Under section 19 of the Second 
Restatement of Contracts, “[t]he manifestation of assent may be made 
wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to 
act.”85  Citing to Industrial American, Inc. v. Fulton Industries, Inc.,86 the 
court stated that Delaware law holds: 
overt manifestation of assent – not subjective intent – controls the 
formation of a contract; [and] the ‘only intent of the parties to a 
contract which is essential is an intent to say the words or do the 
acts which constitute their manifestation of assent’; . . . ‘the 
intention to accept is unimportant except as manifested.’87 
The court considered the content of the instant messages and the 
behavior of the parties to the exchange, and concluded there is an indication 
of “clear assent on the part of both parties to stop sending traffic to the ‘old’ 
[page] and to begin sending the traffic to the two new [pages].”88  In the 
instant message exchange, Soltani of CX Digital asked Touris of Smoking 
Everywhere, “[h]ave you placed the pixels for the two new pages?”89  
Soltani continued, “if so, then I can switch the 
ecig.smokingeverywhere.com link . . . and we can do the test . . . for both 
campaigns.”90  When Touris of Smoking Everywhere apparently had not 
received the pixels from CX Digital that he wanted to place, he asked 
“please send me both pixels and test links so we make sure we get this 
correct.”91  Soltani sent the pixels to Touris by instant message.92 
Once Touris of Smoking Everywhere had placed the pixels, Soltani 
sent an instant message “ok . . . so now I’m quickly switching the link.”93  
Due to troubles in the process, the switch had to be repeated a few times 
before it worked, which involved back and forth instant message 
 
84. Id. at *6. 
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1981). 
86. 285 A.2d 412 (Del. 1971). 
87. CX Digital Media, Inc., 2011 WL 1102782, at *6 (quoting Indus. Am., Inc. v. Fulton 
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 412, 415 (Del. 1971)). 
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communication between Soltani and Touris.94  In addition, Touris and 
Soltani tested the “two new pages” to make sure they worked properly.95  
The court concluded:  “[t]hese actions do not make any sense unless the 
parties had agreed to switch the [pages] to which CX Affiliate traffic was 
being directed.”96  The September 2, 2009 instant message exchange 
“demonstrate[d] an overt manifestation of assent on the part of Smoking 
Everywhere to modify the Insertion Order to permit the web traffic to be 
directed to the [two new pages].  Therefore, Touris agreed on behalf of 
Smoking Everywhere to modify the URL term of the Insertion Order.”97 
B. ELIMINATION OF THE LIMIT 
The court also analyzed whether, as CX Digital claimed, on September 
2, an agreement was reached to remove the limit on the number of customer 
sales per day directed to Smoking Everywhere.98  Along this line, the court 
laid out the relevant Delaware contract law.  In an analysis of the law 
related to section 58 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, the court cited 
to PAMI-LEMB I Inc. v. EMB-NHC, L.L.C.,99 and quoted:  “[i]n order to 
constitute an ‘acceptance,’ a response to an offer must be on identical terms 
as the offer and must be unconditional.”100 
Section 59 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states “[a] reply to 
an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror’s assent 
to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance 
but is a counter-offer.”101  Further, Section 202 of the Restatement would 
have us approach the analysis such that:  “[t]he words and conduct of the 
response are to be interpreted in light of all the circumstances.”102  At this 
 
94. Id.  “This switch has to be repeated several times before it works properly.  During the 
process, Touris twice observes that the test links lead to the ‘old page’ which ‘has not been 
touched,’ and shortly thereafter complains another test link also takes him to ‘ecig.’  Soltani 
responds to each of these complaints by switching the link again.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
95. Id. at *3. 
96. Id. at *7. 
97. Id. at *8. 
98. Id. 
99. 857 A.2d 998, 1015 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
100. CX Digital Media, Inc., 2011 WL 1102782, at *8 (quoting PAMI–LEMB I Inc. v. 
EMB–NHC, L.L.C., 857 A.2d 998, 1015 (Del. Ch.  2004)).  Note that this approach differs from 
the approach under Article 2 of the U.C.C.  Section 2-207 of the U.C.C. eliminates the mirror 
image rule of the general contract law.  U.C.C. § 2-207 (2012).  Consequently, under section 2-
207 analysis, the parties would have been found to have reached agreement as to the number of 
customer sales to be delivered by CX Digital with Touris’ reply of “No Limit.”  In other words, 
Touris’ reply would arguably be a valid acceptance. 
101. CX Digital Media, Inc., 2011 WL 1102782, at *8 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 59 (1981)). 
102. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981)). 
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point in the analysis, the court indicated the relevant text in the Insertion 
Order:  “[i]n the ‘Campaign Details’ section on the first page of the 
Insertion Order, the term ‘VOLUME:’  appears in bold type followed by 
‘200 leads/day.”103  Following their exchange about switching to the “two 
new pages,” Soltani of CX Digital sent an instant message to Touris stating:  
“[w]e can do 2000 orders/day by Friday if I have your blessing . . . [a]nd I 
want the AOR when we make your offer number one on the network.”104  
The court characterized this instant message as an offer to modify the 
original agreement, the Insertion Order.105  In response to Soltani’s offer, 
Touris of Smoking Everywhere sent an instant message “NO LIMIT.”106 
The court characterized this instant message as a rejection of Soltani’s offer 
and a counter-offer.107  In response to Touris’ instant message of “No 
Limit”, Soltani replied in an instant message “awesome!”108  The court 
characterized Soltani’s reply as an acceptance to Touris’ offered 
modification of the insertion order.109 
Soltani offered that CX Digital provide 2000 sales per day to Smoking 
Everywhere, and that it be the exclusive provider of the affiliate advertising 
on the campaign.110  Touris’ response of “NO LIMIT,” indicating that there 
be no limit on the number of sales per day generated by CX Digital’s 
affiliates, varies from Soltani’s two specific terms and, therefore, under the 
common law of contract, amounts to a counter-offer.111  Touris is silent 
about the exclusive provider term.  Soltani’s enthusiastic response of 
“awesome!,” along with increasing the volume of sales directed to Smoking 
Everywhere by CX Digital, is an acceptance of the counter-offer.112  The 
offer, rejection-counter-offer, and acceptance were all in writing.113  
“[W]hen the parties’ statements and conduct are considered, the parties’ 
intent to modify the Insertion Order to change target [pages] and to remove 
the limit on the number of Sales is clear, specific, and direct.”114 
As the court aptly noted:  “[i]t is difficult to imagine more specific and 












113. See generally id. 
114. Id. at *10. 
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simultaneously and doing what they had agreed to do.”115  Therefore, the 
court concludes that the modification of the Insertion Order as to the “two 
new pages” and the elimination of the limit are supported by specific and 
direct evidence.116 
C. NO-ORAL MODIFICATION CLAUSE 
The subject Insertion Order contained a no-oral modifications clause 
(NOM) stating the Insertion Order “may be changed only by a subsequent 
writing signed by both parties.”117  In response to the defendant’s claim that 
the instant message exchange as a modification is unenforceable due to the 
Insertion Order’s NOM, the court stated the law of Delaware with respect to 
NOMs.118  Delaware follows the common law rule embodied in 
Restatement section 149 that “an oral agreement is sufficient to modify or 
rescind a written contract, notwithstanding a provision in the written 
contract purporting to require that subsequent modifications be evidenced 
by writing.”119  Essentially, the common law does not allow for the 
intended effect of no-oral modification clauses.  The court quoted the 
Delaware Supreme Court:  “We think, therefore, that a written agreement 
between contracting parties, despite its terms, is not necessarily only to be 
amended by formal written agreement.”120 
However, the court clearly indicates “the modification was not oral, but 
appeared in writing in an instant-message conversation.”121  Even though 
the court thought the instant message exchange was in an unsigned writing, 
the court determined the same principle applied to the instant message as to 




117. Id. at *11. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. (citing RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 29.42 (4th ed. 1999)).  The 
court notes in a footnote that:  “The common-law rule applies because this [is] a contract for the 
sale of services, not goods.  Therefore, Delaware Code § 2-209, derived from the Uniform 
Commercial Code and permitting a signed-writing requirement, does not apply.”  Id. at *11 n.19. 
120. Id. at *12 (quoting Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Asbury Park v. Pepsico, Inc., 297 A.2d 
28, 33 (Del. 1972). 
121. Id. (citing Haft v. Dart Group Corp., 841 F. Supp. 549, 567 (D. Del. 1993)) (footnote 
omitted). 
[T]he Court has satisfied itself that neither the agreement memorialized by the 
Insertion Order nor the modification of the Insertion Order made during the instant-
message conversation falls within Delaware’s statute of frauds . . . .  In any case, the 
statute of frauds is an affirmative defense; it was not pleaded by the Defendant and is 
therefore waived. 
Id. at *12 n.20 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2714 (2012)). 
122. Id. at *12. 
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an unsigned writing containing the terms of the agreement to modify the 
Insertion Order.  CX Digital [was] not alleging there are additional oral 
terms to the modification that [were] not evident from the instant 
messages.”123 
Further, the court stated that even if the instant message exchange did 
not amount to an enforceable modification, and the NOM clause in the 
Insertion Order was enforceable, Smoking Everywhere would have waived 
the NOM provision.124  The court cited to Williston on Contracts, indicating  
“where, following the oral modification, one of the parties materially 
changes position in reliance on the oral modification, the courts are in 
general agreement that the other party will be held to have waived or be 
estopped from asserting the no oral modification clause.”125 
Smoking Everywhere’s waiver occurred because, after the instant 
message exchange, CX Digital “materially changed its position in reliance” 
on the modifications articulated in the instant message exchange.126  CX 
Digital changed its course of performance and sent a significantly increased 
number of sales to Smoking Everywhere at the “two new pages.”  Further, 
Smoking Everywhere received the increased number of sales without 
complaint.  As a result of CX Digital’s reliance and the fact that Smoking 
Everywhere did not complain, Smoking Everywhere was estopped from 
asserting the NOM as a defense.127 
D. CONSIDERATION 
Smoking Everywhere claimed that it did not provide the necessary 
consideration for the modification to render it enforceable.128  The court 
again articulated Delaware law and found that there was adequate 
consideration for the elimination of the limit on sales directed to Smoking 
Everywhere.129  Therefore, if there is not adequate consideration for the 
change to “two new pages,” justice required binding Smoking Everywhere 
because of CX Digital’s reliance.130 
 
123. Id. at *11. 
124. Id. at *12. 
125. Id. (citing RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 29.42 (4th ed.1999)). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at *13. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. (“Delaware courts define consideration as a benefit to a promisor or a detriment to a 
promisee pursuant to the promisor’s request.” (citing Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., Inc., 
1219, 1232 (Del. Ch. 2000))); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1981) 
(“[A] promise which is bargained for is consideration.”). 
In exchange for CX Digital’s promise to provide an unlimited number of Sales to 
Smoking Everywhere, Smoking Everywhere made an implied promise to pay for those 
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III. LAW OF CONTRACTS 
Under the law of contract modification, a promisee may agree to 
change the terms of a contract with a promisor, provided certain 
requirements are met.  The common law on contract modification and the 
enforceability of modifications emphasizes the need for additional 
consideration.131  The Second Restatement of Contracts offers guidance 
about contract modifications.132  Section 73 of the Restatement continues 
the common law’s requirement of additional consideration for 
modification.133  Section 73 provides that modifications supported by 
consideration are enforceable unless the consideration is a “pretense” or 
obtained by duress.134  It states: 
Performance of Legal Duty:  Performance of a legal duty owed to 
a promisor, which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest 
dispute is not consideration; but a similar performance is 
consideration if it differs from what was required by the duty in a 
way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain.135 
Section 73 embodies the “pre-existing duty rule.”136  Under this 
Restatement approach, modifications will be considered “an express or 
implied threat to withhold performance of a legal duty” unless supported by 
additional consideration from the promise.137  Further, under the common 
law and Restatement, to be enforceable, modifications must be “fair and 
equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the 
contract was made.”138  This approach presumes that coercion exists 
 
additional Sales at the rate defined in the Insertion Order – $45 per Sale.  Smoking 
Everywhere’s implied promise to pay is the consideration for CX Digital sending 
more Sales. 
CX Digital Media, Inc., 2011 WL 1102782, at *12. 
131. Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 684-85 (1982). 
132. Subha Narasimhan, Modification:  The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 
YALE L.J. 61, 75 (1987); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 73, 75 (1981).  
“While the Restatement does not in itself carry legal authority, its treatment of modification is an 
accurate formulation of the developing law of modification for contracts not governed by the 
U.C.C.”  Narasimhan, supra note, at n.71; see, e.g., Brian Const. & Dev. Co. v. Brightenti, 405 
A.2d 72, 76 (1978) (asserting the Second Restatement of Contracts is a source of law applicable to 
contract modifications). 
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73; see Narasimhan, supra note 132, at 75. 
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73; see Narasimhan, supra note 132, at 75. 
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73. 
136. See id. 
137. Hillman, supra note 131, at 681 n.6. 
138. Narasimhan, supra note 132, at 75. 
While, as in the U.C.C., the Restatement does not explicitly allocate the burden of 
proof, again the promisor is usually assigned the burden, and he cannot enforce the 
modification unless he can demonstrate that it was a fair response to an unanticipated 
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between promisor and promisee, unless additional consideration has been 
included by the promisee.139 
Much of the analysis of the common law of contract modification 
delves into the voluntariness of the modification and, while not explicitly 
stating, the CX Digital decision was no exception.  Under traditional 
contract modification law, the guiding premise is the belief that only the 
party to the contract that requests the modification actually seeks to gain 
more than his due under the original contract.140  The reason for this belief 
derives from the concept that the other party to the contract is, without 
modification, entitled to her original contractual rights and, therefore, 
without more, stands to gain nothing with the modification.141  It has been 
urged that this approach wrongly leads to the bar of enforcement of 
voluntary modifications without consideration.142  Alternatively, the 
modern approach to contract modification law deemphasizes this 
presumption, and endeavors to accommodate the need for flexibility of the 
contracting parties but, meanwhile, trying to limit the danger to one party 
that the other party may leverage the contractual relationship to get more 
than their due.143  The court in CX Digital seems to have followed this 
approach in its written opinion and in the effect of the opinion on practices. 
To many practitioners and academics, the U.C.C. has greatly simplified 
commercial transactions and, over all, significantly improved commercial 
law.144  As its name suggests, the U.C.C. sought to make the relevant law 
“uniform . . . among the various jurisdictions.”145  Behind the efforts of the 
drafters of the U.C.C., and particularly Article 2, ran the notion that the 
 
circumstance.  The comments and illustrations emphasize that the unanticipated 
circumstances must be ‘objectively demonstrable’ and that the increase in price not 
exceed additional costs imposed by the ‘unanticipated circumstance. 
Id. 
139. Hillman, supra note 131, at 686.  “To avoid the problem of sham consideration 
rendering a modification enforceable, section 73 also requires that additional consideration reflect 
‘more than a pretense of bargain.’”  Id. at 686-87 (“As a result, the Restatement Second’s 
approach to contract modification inevitably will lead to the enforcement of some coerced 
modifications and the denial of some voluntary ones.”). 
140. Id. 
141. Narasimhan, supra note 132, at 62. 
142. Hillman, supra note 131, at 702-03.  “The Restatement Second approach suffers from 
lack of clarity because of the difficulties of defining ‘unanticipated circumstances’ and the 
broadness of the ‘fair and equitable,’ ‘honesty’ and ‘justice requires’ terminology.”  Id. 
143. Narasimhan, supra note 132, at 61. 
144. Maggs, supra note 27, at 85.  “The UCC has served the commercial law well for fifty 
years and will continue to do so for a long time in the future. Courts have come to treat it with 
respect and even admiration.”  Id. at 120. 
145. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (2012); Maggs, supra note 27, at 103. 
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Code would “permit the continued expansion of commercial practices.”146  
Due to its appeal, history has witnessed the adoption in every state in the 
United States (to the exclusion of Louisiana), the District of Columbia, and 
some of the federal territories of the U.C.C. in its entirety.147 
Certainly, those same practitioners and academics may also find the 
U.C.C. (and its revisions) less than perfect.148  Arguments exist that the 
U.C.C. already contains antiquated ideas, fails to respond to recent 
developments in law or commercial practices, and the statute resists 
adaption and change.149  Of course, in light of the analysis in this Article, 
the instant messaging medium is most definitely a recent development in 
commercial practices.  A question arises:  is the U.C.C. adaptable to 
accommodate recent developments and the surrounding business 
circumstances? 
The U.C.C. covers subjects the common law used to address.150  For 
instance, the law related to contracts for the sale of goods is now embodied 
principally in Article 2 of the U.C.C.  More specifically, the law of sale of 
goods contract modification is governed by section 2-209 of the U.C.C.151  
The law of modification under the U.C.C. focuses on an analysis of the 
facts and circumstances that lead to the demand for modification and the 
fairness of the actual modification.152  However, the U.C.C. did not, nor 
arguably could not, completely replace the common law in each of the areas 
the U.C.C. was designed to address.  It is not intended that the U.C.C. 
provide exclusive law in those areas.153  As Professor Gilmore described: 
The Uniform Commercial Code, so-called, is not that sort of Code 
– even in theory. . . .  We shall do better to think of it as a big 
statute – or a collection of statutes bound together in the same 
book – which goes as far as it goes but no further.  It assumes the 
continuing existence of a large body of pre-Code and non-Code 
 
146. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b); see 3 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:38, at 
714 (4th ed. 2007) (arguing that the U.C.C. creates flexibility). 
147. Maggs, supra note 27, at 85. 
148. Id. at 86 n.38. 
149. Id. (citing as an example U.C.C. § 2A-201(1)(b) (2001)). 
150. Maggs, supra note 27, at 93.  “The UCC replaces the Uniform Sales Act, which 
previously replaced the common law.  The common law treated contracts for the sale of goods 
differently from other contracts in several ways.”  Id. 
151. U.C.C. § 2-209 (2012). 
152. Narasimhan, supra note 132, at 75. 
153. Id. at 94. 
          
632 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:613 
law on which it rests for support, which it displaces to the least 
possible extent, and without which it could not survive.”154 
When drafting the U.C.C., the drafters were not limited only to restating 
and strictly adhering to existing law.  Instead, the drafters created a code 
that has several sections, and a general theme that would support adaptation 
and change.155  In fact, consistent with these concepts, the drafters of the 
U.C.C. provided for the continued role of the common law rules by 
including section 1-103 of the U.C.C.  Section 1-103 of the U.C.C. states: 
[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the 
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the 
law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or 
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its 
provisions.156 
What is a court to do if it faces a situation not covered by the U.C.C.?  The 
court continues by using other principles of law to supplement its analysis.  
The supplementing materials include the common law.  If nothing exists in 
the common law, a court may create a new common law approach.157  
Specifically, the drafters of Article 2 of the U.C.C. sought to codify, clarify, 
and make uniform the then existing law related to the sale of goods.  
Therefore, when a court confronts gaps in the provisions of the U.C.C. or 
ambiguities, it may resort to consulting preexisting law, including prior 
version(s) of the U.C.C., other statutory law or the common law.158  In the 
process of using the common law to supplement the U.C.C., the court must 
keep in the mind the legislative intent of the U.C.C. 
But, as has been observed and commented on in one fashion or 
another: “the drafting [of the U.C.C.] is perhaps the worst . . . .”159 and, 
specifically, section 2-209, has caused much confusion.160  In this way, as 
discussed in more depth below, the CX Digital decision may shed light on 
the sale of goods transactions and modifications because the legal impact of 
an instant message exchange on modification is not provided for in the 
U.C.C. specifically, nor in the common law related to Article 2.  Further, 
 
154. Maggs, supra note 27, at 94 (citing to Grant Gilmore, Article 9:  What It Does for the 
Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (1966)). 
155. Newell, supra note 30, at 492. 
156. U.C.C. § 1-103 (emphasis added). 
157. Maggs, supra note 27, at 94 (citing Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. 
Supp. 1225, 1239 (D.N.J. 1979)) (noting courts may improvise new common-law rights to 
supplement the U.C.C.). 
158. Id. at 117-18. 
159. Newell, supra note 30, at 487. 
160. Maggs, supra note 27, at 95. 
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section 2-209 of the U.C.C. perplexes academics, practitioners, and courts.  
As such, the CX Digital decision sheds light on how to interpret instant 
message modification under the U.C.C. 
A. GENERAL U.C.C. PROVISIONS 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies to the sale of goods.161  In addition to 
establishing provisions to uniformly govern sale of goods transactions, it 
also provides provisions for contract formation, contract enforcement, 
contract terms, and warranties.162  In order for Article 2 to apply, the 
transaction must involve a sale of goods.  Section 2-105(1) defines “goods” 
as “all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification to the 
contract for sale” including future goods.163  When does a contract for the 
sale of goods transaction exist?  Section 2-204(1) identifies the provision 
for the basic identification of a contract, indicating “[a] contract for the sale 
of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement.”164  
This manner may include the conduct of the parties.165  Section 2-206 of the 
U.C.C identifies the manner in which acceptance of an offer may be made: 
“[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated . . . an offer to make a 
contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any 
medium reasonable in the circumstances.”166 
In the circumstances of an evaluation of the effect of a purported 
acceptance, the common law of contracts, uniformly identified in the 
Restatements, applies the mirror image rule.  Contrary to this approach, 
section 2-207 of the U.C.C permits:  “[a] definite and seasonable expression 
of acceptance . . . sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance 
even though it states terms additional to or different from those 
offered . . . unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the 
additional or different terms.”167  Even in this way, an acceptance does not 
have to be the mirror image of the offer. 
Further, Article 2 is similarly much more apt to find a contract when 
terms are left open or omitted than the common law of contracts.168  Section 
2-204 of the U.C.C. allows that terms may be left open.  “Even though one 
 
161. U.C.C. § 2-102. 
162. BRUCE S. NATHAN ET AL., FIFTY WAYS TO LEAVE YOUR DEBTOR:  LESSER-KNOWN 
REMEDIES FOR JILTED CREDITORS (2007), WL 041207 ABI-CLE 1015. 
163. U.C.C. § 2-105(2). 
164. Id. § 2-204(1). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. § 2-206. 
167. Id. § 2-207. 
168. See, e.g., Newell, supra note 30, at 500. 
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or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not fail for 
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a 
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”169  In light of 
the decision in CX Digital, it is important to note four particular differences 
between the common law of contracts and the law of the U.C.C. related to 
the sale of goods.  With regard to contract formation:  1) the mirror image 
rule does not apply under Article 2, and 2) Article 2’s emphasis is on 
finding agreement even when terms are missing.  In an analysis of the 
modification, 1) Article 2 of the U.C.C. does not require consideration; and 
2) the common law of contract does not enforce NOM clauses. 
B. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACTS:  SECTION 2-209 
Section 2-209 of the U.C.C. governs modification of contracts for the 
sale of goods.  It supports the enforcement of a modification that is entered 
into freely and clearly.170  As stated in comment 1 of the official comments 
of section 2-209:  “[t]his section seeks to protect and make effective all 
necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to 
the technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments.”171  However, 
it has been noted: 
Section 2-209 is complex, not simple; murky, not clear; and, with 
the exception of subsection (1), antiquated, not modern . . . There 
is a “schizophrenic” quality about the section as it wanders back 
and forth between language which supports easier modification of 
sales contracts and language which makes effective modifications 
more difficult.172 
While certain differences between the law of contracts and Article 2 of the 
U.C.C have not caused courts much consternation, the differences as to 
modification and application of section 2-209 of the U.C.C. have caused 
difficulty.173 
 
169. U.C.C. § 2-204(3). 
170. See Newell, supra note 30, at 489. 
171. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 1. 
172. Newell, supra note 30, at 489. 
From a style standpoint, the drafting of section 2-209 seems to suffer from one or a 
combination of the following ills:  ‘committee’ drafting, ‘bad Restatement’ drafting, 
‘Rube Goldberg’ drafting or ‘old soil’ drafting.  The result of these drafting ills is a 
Code section which can be interpreted in a wide variety of ways to justify a rigid or 
flexible approach to modifications or something in between. 
Id. at 491. 
173. LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 722. 
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1. No Consideration 
Unlike the common law of contracts, Article 2 of the U.C.C. does not 
require consideration for modification to be binding.174  As a result, while 
the CX Digital court responded to Smoking Everywhere’s claim of lack of 
consideration in the common law context, this Article need not with regards 
to modification of a contract for the sale of goods.  Instead, Article 2 
requires that the parties must conduct themselves in good faith.  While 
modification under the U.C.C. does not require consideration, the 
modification must be made in good faith, “and the extortion of a 
‘modification’ without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a 
violation of the duty of good faith.”175  “Good faith” is honesty in fact in the 
transaction at issue and reasonable commercial standards of fairness in 
dealing.176 
Guiding an analysis of modification under Article 2, the U.C.C. created 
the overarching requirement of good faith embodied in revised section 1-
304 of the U.C.C.  Further, section 2-209 of the U.C.C. specifically governs 
modification of a contract for the sale of goods,177 and requires the 
contracting parties exercise good faith in their modification of the 
contract.178  Arguably this requirement of good faith in contract 
modification for a sale of goods contract (without the requirement for 
additional consideration) has not caused great consternation for the 
courts.179  Given that modifications differ in context from the original 
contract, many of the reasons for the requirement of a promise for a promise 
(consideration) loses force since enforceable promises have already been 
made in the original contract.180  With the concept of the promise for a 
promise of the original contract, the U.C.C. encourages flexibility by not 
requiring consideration for modification. 
 
174. U.C.C. § 2-209(1).  See Narasimhan, supra note 132, at 73-74.  “This might suggest that 
all modifications that do not run afoul of the laws of duress are enforceable.  Few modifications 
would be defeated under traditional duress scrutiny.” 
175. UCC § 2-209 cmt. 2. 
176. UCC § 1-102(20) [Rev.]; see LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 717-19 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a); U.C.C. § 1-201(19); U.C.C § 2-103(1)(b)). 
177. “[T]he most significant revision to Section 2-209 is the substitution of the term ‘record’ 
for the term ‘writing,’ a substitution made throughout the Uniform Commercial Code, including 
throughout Article 2, to ensure that electronic transactions, which store the parties’ agreement, 
will be as viable under Article 2 as traditional paper writings.”  LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 
722. 
178. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2; see Newell, supra note 30, at 489. 
179. LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 722.  “The requirements that contracting parties under 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code exercise good faith, in lieu of the traditional 
requirements of consideration, when modifying a contract for the sale of goods, has not created 
significant problems for the court.”  Id. 
180. Newell, supra note 30, at 489-90. 
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However, under the sale of goods analysis, a party, like CX Digital, 
may have an argument that the corresponding party, like Smoking 
Everywhere, failed to act in good faith during the modification of the 
Insertion Order, if it can be established that Smoking Everywhere entered 
into the contract modification with the intent to benefit, and not keep its 
promise, instead claiming the NOM clause as a defense.  The test for good 
faith, found in U.C.C. section 1-201(20) [Revised] and official comment 20 
is “honesty in fact” and “observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing.”181  Arguably, if the client were to conduct itself knowing of 
the NOM, not disclosing it (if, for instance, the opposing party might have 
forgotten), and intending to benefit but not keep its promise using the NOM 
as a defense, this may not arise to the level of “honesty in fact” and 
“observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” that 
embody good faith.  While the U.C.C., specifically section 2-209, does not 
explicitly identify the previously mentioned opportunism of the promisee 
assumed under traditional common law doctrine,182 the U.C.C. does require 
that the parties act in good faith and, thereby, seeks to thwart promisee 
opportunism. 
2. No-Oral Modifications Clause 
While the lack of need for consideration may provide greater flexibility 
for business people attempting to modify a contract, arguably section 2-
209(2), the NOM section, does not.  Section 2-209(2) states “[a] signed 
agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed 
writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded . . . .”183  As stated 
earlier and by the court in the CX Digital decision, the common law of 
contract modification does not enforce NOM clauses: 
The law is crystal clear that a written contract may be modified 
orally.  Even where the contract provides that any non-written 
modification will not be recognized.  Such a contract may be 
modified, changed or a new one substituted for it and this may be 
 
181. UCC § 1-201(20) cmt. 20.  “While the U.C.C. is not explicit on this issue, courts and 
commentators usually assume that the promisor, the party attempting to enforce a modification, 
has the burden of proof as to the contract’s enforceability.  The promisor, therefore, must 
demonstrate that the modification was made in good faith.”  Narasimhan, supra note 132, at 74 
(footnote omitted). 
182. Id. at 74-75.  “This is equally true of the Restatement.”  Id. 
183. U.C.C. § 2-209(2). 
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established by parole evidence showing either an express 
agreement or actions necessarily involving alterations.184 
This Article explores the application of the CX Digital line of analysis to 
circumstances involving a contract for the sale of goods under Article 2 of 
the U.C.C. in addition to a common law analysis as in the actual decision. 
Arguments exist that section 2-209 actually makes modification more 
difficult than under the common law of contracts.185  Due to the confusion 
of 2-209, courts take different approaches in their analysis and reach 
different results.  In fact, the results have been so disparate that decisions 
have been made that equally forbid and allow certain modifications under a 
NOM for similar transactions.186  Unlike the common law,187 Article 2 of 
the U.C.C. recognizes parties’ right to put a NOM clause in their 
agreement.188  Under section 2-209(2) of the U.C.C., a contract may have a 
clause that requires a signed writing for modifications.189  It is worth noting 
that the official comment 3 to section 2-209 states “subsections (2) and (3) 
are intended to protect against false allegations of oral modifications.”190  
This type of clause has been referred to as a private statute of frauds or a 
 
184. Wymard v. McCloskey & Co., 217 F. Supp. 143, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (citations 
omitted). 
185. Newell, supra note 30, at 497.  Referencing a widely cited case discussing these 
subsections of the U.C.C., Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, in which Professors 
Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook disagree, one author writes “[p]ity the average lawyer or 
judge confronting these subsections if these heavy hitters cannot agree. Not only will many 
lawyers and judges face uncertainty but that uncertainty will inevitably lead to frustration as they 
struggle with the complexity of the provision.”  Id. at 493-94 (citing Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l 
Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
186. Id. at 497. 
187. Wymard, 217 F. Supp. at 147; see LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 722-23 (citing to 
Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986); Wymard v. McCloskey 
& Co., 217 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1963)). 
188. UCC § 1-201(b)(31)[Rev.]; LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 722-23. 
189. Newell, supra note 30, at 490. 
190. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 3. 
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NOMs clause.191  However, for this reason, some argue the U.C.C.’s 
provisions regarding NOM clauses are antiquated.192 
In the CX Digital decision, the court responded to Smoking 
Everywhere’s claim that they did not pay CX Digital because there was an 
unenforceable modification to the NOM clause in the Insertion Order.193  
The court in CX Digital applied three layers of analysis to this issue:  (1) an 
oral agreement “is sufficient to modify or rescind a written contract, 
notwithstanding” a NOM in the contract; (2) the modification by instant 
message exchange was not oral, it was in writing; and (3) even if the NOM 
clause had effect, Smoking Everywhere would have waived the NOM based 
on CX Digital’s reliance and Smoking Everywhere’s failure to complain.194  
Professor Douglas Newell has also identified a helpful three-step approach 
to a NOM analysis under section 2-209(2) of the U.C.C.  “Three basic 
questions seem to recur:  First, what is excluded by a NOM clause under 
subsection (2)? Second, what is waived by a “waiver” under subsection (3)? 
Third, how does a party waive something under subsection (4) and (5)?”195 
Addressing Newell’s first question, section 2-209(2) seems to be 
screaming a simple answer that a NOM clause excludes anything that is not 
in a signed writing that purports to modify the original contract.  Of the 
interpretations of 2-209(2), this is the most expansive reading and has been 
adopted by several courts.196  In this situation, if there is no signed writing 
evidencing the modification, i.e., if the alleged modification fails under 2-
209(2) (or the 2-201 statute of frauds) the party must establish waiver under 
section 2-209(4).197 
A second approach under the interpretation of section 2-209(2) is that 
“the NOM clause only blocks proof of the terms of an executory oral 
 
191. See, e.g., Newell, supra note 30, at 497-98. 
Labeling a NOM clause as a “private” statute of frauds is customary for the obvious 
reasons that the parties include it in the contract and the typical clause requires a 
signed writing for any modification.  In the context of section 2-209, the “private” 
statute of frauds of subsection (2) appears to have a broader reach than the “public” 
provision in subsection (3).  If every modification needed a signed writing to satisfy 
subsection (3), there would seem to be no need for subsection (2).  The better reading 
of subsection (3) is that its writing requirement applies to the contract as a whole, 
including any modification.  If that is so, the original writing may satisfy the “public” 
statute of frauds without a separate writing for the modification unless the 
modification changes the quantity of goods covered. 
Id. 
192. Id. at 487. 
193. CX Digital Media, Inc. v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., No. 09-62020-CIV, 2011 WL  
1102782, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2011). 
194. Id. at *11-12. 
195. Newell, supra note 30, at 494. 
196. Id. 
197. U.C.C. § 2-209(4); see discussion infra pp. 639-42 as to waiver. 
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agreement to modify the original contract.”198  The result of this approach is 
that the party advocating the modification that was not evidenced in a 
signed writing could put forth evidence to show that the parties’ course of 
performance modified the contract.199  The conduct of the parties to a sale 
of goods contract may be such as to constitute a modification of their 
agreement.200  This approach also recognizes the intent of the drafters 
explained in comment 3 to section 2-209.  Since the intent was to “protect 
against false allegations of oral modifications,” if the parties had engaged in 
a modifying course of performance the inference of a false allegation is 
much harder to prove, if not eliminated (as is the case in CX Digital).  If 
this approach were pursued by the party advocating the modification, proof 
of waiver pursuant to section 2-209(4) is less important.201 
As a result of the complicated issues related to contract modification 
under Article 2, establishing an enforceable modification may be more 
difficult than the original contract.202  Looking at the facts of the CX Digital 
case, a party in CX Digital’s shoes in a sale of goods transaction would be 
faced with these two approaches.  First, the CX Digital party may argue the 
modification was not oral because it was made in an instant message 
exchange, a writing.  This follows the conclusion that the CX Digital court 
made.203  Arguably, the instant messages may not have been signed.  
However, the CX Digital party may make the argument that the instant 
messages were signed.  The definition of “signed” under section 1-201(37) 
of the U.C.C. provides “‘[s]igned’ includes using any symbol executed or 
adopted with present intention to adopt or accept a writing.”204  The 
usernames of “nicktouris” and “pedramcx” arguably may be considered 
signatures if the “intention to adopt” can be established.  One can imagine, 
however, a situation where the username is not so closely aligned to the 
user.  In that case, the “signed” argument is much more difficult. 
If, however, the instant message exchange is determined to not qualify 
as a modification because it is not a signed writing as required by the NOM 
 
198. Newell, supra note 30, at 494. 
199. Id. 
200. 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 332 (2012). 
201. Newell, supra note 30, at 495. 
202. Id. at 501.  “Such a result seems both possible and absurd.”  Id. 
[P]ermitting a NOM clause seems contrary to the spirit of the Article 2 contract 
formation provisions and to the newer ideas of relational contract.  While the “waiver” 
language of subsection (4) may help in some cases, the overall effect of section 2-209 
is to make the sales contract formation process more rigid. 
Id. at 497. 
203. See generally CX Digital Media, Inc. v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., No. 09-62020-CIV, 
2011 WL 1102782 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2011). 
204. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (2012). 
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clause (or for another reason), the CX Digital party in a sale of goods 
transaction may pursue waiver or modification by course of performance.  
Professor Newell’s suggested three-part analysis addresses the issue of 
waiver as well, and will be discussed in depth below.  First, however, this 
Article considers the CX Digital party’s argument for modification by 
course of performance.  Section 1-303(a) of the U.C.C identifies course of 
performance as: 
[A] sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular 
transaction that exists if:  (1) the agreement of the parties with 
respect to the transaction involves repeated occasions for 
performance by a party; and (2) the other party, with knowledge of 
the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it, 
accepts the performance or acquiesces in it without objection.205 
As applied to the situation of an oral agreement to modify, the argument is 
set forth well in the appellate brief in Paulsen Real Estate Corp. v. 
Grammick.206 
[W]hen the oral agreement to modify has [i]n fact been acted upon 
to completion, the [sic] need to protect the integrity of the written 
agreement from false claims of modifications does not arise.  In 
such [c]ase, not only may past oral discussions be relied upon to 
test the alleged modification, but the actions taken may 
demonstrate, objectively, the nature and extent of the 
modification . . . Moreover, apart from statute, a contract once 
made can be unmade, and a contractual prohibition against oral 
modification may itself be waived . . . .207 
An oral modification may be enforceable if full performance has occurred. 
As in CX Digital, an oral modification may be fully enforceable when the 
modification has been fully performed.208  If, on the other hand, there is 
only partial performance under the contract that is inconsistent with the 
contract, the parties may effectuate a modification without a signed writing 
when the “partial performance be unequivocally referable to the oral 
modification.”209 
Further, section 1-303(f) provides “[s]ubject to Section 2-20 . . . a 
course of performance is relevant to show a waiver or modification of any 
 
205. Id. § 1-303(a). 
206. Brief for Respondent at 17, In re Paulsen Real Estate Corp. v. Grammick, 663 N.Y.S.2d 
660 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (No. 1996-07816), 1997 WL 34664043. 
207. Id. at 18-19. 
208. Id. at 19. 
209. Id. 
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term inconsistent with the course of performance.”  What is the difference?  
A party waives a term when it relinquishes a right already known and held 
by the party.  The party that waived the term or right has not permanently 
lost the right if retraction is possible.  With an effective retraction, the term 
or right that had been waived may be reinstated to full effect.  On the other 
hand, through a modification the parties agree to change the terms of the 
contract.210  At such point, parties may change the modification through 
another modification. 
The course of performance relevant to this Article’s analysis is the 
sending of sales by the CX Digital party, acceptance by Smoking 
Everywhere to the “two new pages” and of the increased customer sales, 
without the Smoking Everywhere party’s complaint.  Comment 1 to section 
1-303 states the intent of the drafters of the UCC as to “reject[s] both the 
‘lay-dictionary’ and the ‘conveyancer’s’ reading of a commercial 
agreement.  Instead, the meaning of the agreement of the parties is to be 
determined by the language used by them and by their action, read and 
interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding 
circumstances.”211 
A party like CX Digital in a sale of goods transaction could argue that a 
modification of the agreement had been effectuated when the CX Digital 
party immediately increased the number of customer sales sent to the 
Smoking Everywhere party and to the two new pages without complaint 
from the Smoking Everywhere party over a month.  In fact, the Smoking 
Everywhere party, through its agent Touris, worked to ensure that problems 
with receipt to the two new pages of the increased sales went without 
problem.  The course of performance modified the contract. 
Professor Newell clarified that his second question for a NOM 
analysis, “concerning what is waived,” has potential also to produce more 
than one approach and, therefore, more than one answer.212  Some may 
have suspected that removal of the requirement for consideration would be 
the biggest issue that Article 2 would create for the law of contracts as it 
applies to the sale of goods, but, in reality, courts have been most stumped 
by whether an attempted modification is a modification in light of a NOM 
and whether something has been waived.213  First, some have interpreted a 
waiver to apply to the specific provision of the original agreement,214 i.e., in 
the case of a CX Digital-like situation the specific provisions would be the 
 
210. SCOTT J. BURNHAM, GLANNON GUIDE TO SALES 98 (2d ed. 2012). 
211. U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 1 (2012). 
212. Newell, supra note 30, at 495-96. 
213. LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 727. 
214. Newell, supra note 30, at 495-96. 
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“Volume” and identified pages in the Insertion Order.  In this way, the 
parties may eliminate the specific terms by waiving them, replacing them 
with new terms.  Therefore, section 1-303(f) would allow course of 
performance of the parties to help prove elimination of the old terms 
through waiver and replacement.  If the waiver is not retracted, the waiver 
stands. 
Another waiver approach argues that the party waived the NOM 
clause.215  This is the approach the CX Digital court articulated briefly.216  
The court held that the reliance by CX Digital and failure to complain by 
Smoking Everywhere amounted to a waiver of the NOM, and Smoking 
Everywhere was estopped from claiming the NOM as a defense.  Through 
the course of performance, once again, the CX Digital party may claim that 
the NOM clause was waived by Smoking Everywhere.  Once the NOM 
clause is removed, the oral modification or, in this case, a written but, 
perhaps, unsigned modification of the Insertion Order terms for web pages 
and “volume”, would be enforceable. 
Professor Newell’s final question addresses how the waiver was done. 
At least one court required an express waiver.  Conduct of the 
parties ignoring the NOM clause is another possible avenue.  The 
most obvious reading of section 2-209(4) is that the failed oral 
agreement itself is the basis of the waiver and at least can be 
shown to establish a waiver if not to establish all the terms of the 
modification.217 
The U.C.C. has been interpreted to hold that even if there is a NOM clause, 
it is possible that the parties may try to modify or rescind the agreement 
orally and end up waiving the NOM clause.218  In addition, if a waiver 
occurred, it may be retracted by reasonable notification by the waiving 
party and the effect is not unjust to the other party.219 
The parties’ course of performance is important evidence to determine 
if any rights have been waived or modified.  A repeated course of conduct 
that is inconsistent with the terms of the contract with a NOM may be 
waiver or modification.220  As the court determined in CX Digital, if the 
 
215. Id. 
216. See generally CX Digital Media, Inc. v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., No. 09-62020-CIV, 
2011 WL 1102782 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2011). 
217. Newell, supra note 30, at 496. 
218. U.C.C. § 2-209(4); U.C.C. § 2-209(4) [Rev.]; LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 724-25. 
219. U.C.C. § 2-209(5); see LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 725-26 (indicating also that 
Second Restatement of Contracts section 89(c), comment d adopts this approach). 
220. 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 332 (2012). 
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NOM had been an issue, Smoking Everywhere waived it because CX 
Digital performed in reliance, and Smoking Everywhere did not complain. 
C. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Also relevant to the analysis of a modification under Article 2 of the 
U.C.C. is a determination of whether the statute of frauds has been satisfied.  
Section 2-201 of the U.C.C. embodies the statute of frauds, also referred to 
as the public statute of frauds to distinguish it from the NOM, which is 
referred to as the private statute of frauds.221  While not part of the analysis 
in this Article discussing the CX Digital decision, proper analysis of the 
modification requirements of the U.C.C. begs a mention of the requirements 
of the statute of frauds.  Non-compliance with the statute of frauds may 
present a modification from being enforceable under section 2-209(3).222  
Section 2-201 of the U.C.C. requires that a contract for the sale of goods in 
the amount of five hundred dollars or more must be in writing, contain the 
quantity term, and be signed by the party against whom enforcement is 
sought.223  Section 2-209(3) requires that any modification satisfy the 
statute of frauds of 2-201 if “the contract as modified is within its 
provisions.”224 
IV. WESTERN NORTH DAKOTA AND CONCLUSION 
 “Men increasingly rely upon the spoken word, given in person or by 
  telephone; and it is the function of the courts to do justice in such 
  cases.  It no longer serves for the court to throw a plaintiff out of 
  court saying, ‘It was your folly not to get his signature.’”225 
 
Imagine, now, a boomtown – where business is flying so fast it is 
smoking.  Business cannot keep up with the needs of development.  As 
building plans are made, materials purchased, man-power hired: contracts 
are being entered into at an equally fast pace.  Similarly, circumstances are 
continually in flux for the participants.  A delivery may be delayed, parts 
may be unavailable, or work is postponed until the delayed delivery arrives.  
When business is booming, so, too, are contract modifications.226  As 
western North Dakota is experiencing monumental economic growth, just 
 
221. See U.C.C. § 2-201. 
222. Id. §§ 2-209(3), 2-201; see LORD, supra note 146, § 7:38, at 723-24. 
223. U.C.C. § 2-201. 
224. Id. 
225. Newell, supra note 30, at 590 (quoting ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 
1295, at 212 (1962)). 
226. Gorrie, supra note 2, at W23; see also Mackinnon, supra note 3. 
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like any rapidly changing business situation, it is helpful to note that one of 
the primary goals of contract law is allocation of risk.  Moreover, the law of 
contract modification should promote and uphold the necessary flexibility 
and reliability to achieve the enforcement of uncoerced alterations of 
existing contractual arrangements.227  In turn, upholding freely-made 
contract modifications allows for freedom of contract which promotes 
economic growth, such as in western North Dakota.228  Whether in codified 
laws, rules, regulations or judge made law, law that prohibits or stymies 
parties’ ability to change contract terms when parties freely wish to change 
the terms, would serve to discourage parties from entering into contractual 
relations in the first place.  This constriction, thereby, negatively affects 
economic growth.229  Such laws would clearly stymy commercial practices, 
in general, and particularly in places teaming with commercial 
development, like western North Dakota.230 
However, on the flip side of the coin, while freedom of contract 
supports voluntary alteration of the parties’ agreement, the parties to the 
agreement should also be able to rely on the contract and its terms.  Without 
being able to rely on the contract and the commitment made therein, parties 
would be challenged to plan for the future.231  Similarly, the inability to rely 
on contract commitment could stymy economic development.  
Consequently, we see that law must by reliable and adaptable just like the 
contracts that govern the relations between parties.  The necessary balance 
then is finding a doctrine that allows for flexibility while policing against 
opportunism.232 
The decision in CX Digital supports the concepts of flexibility and 
reliability in contracting by identifying that instant message exchanges may 
cause modification of a contract with a NOM and ensuring that when 
parties willingly enter into a modification it is upheld, especially when 
another party has relied on the modification.  Therefore, an essential 
element of the analysis is an evaluation of the voluntariness of each party’s 
entry into the modification.233  Pursuant to the provisions of the U.C.C., 
when there are gaps or ambiguities, courts should follow the common law 
 




231. Id. at 681-82. 
232. Narasimhan, supra note 132, at 61. 
233. Hillman, supra note 131, at 682.  “Literally hundreds of cases deciding the 
enforceability of contract modifications confirm that this is the paramount, although rarely 
articulated, concern of courts facing the question.  The challenge of modification law is to 
prescribe workable rules that take into account this issue of voluntariness.”  Id. 
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and legislative intent.234  In North Dakota, the law recognizes that, for 
interpretation of gaps and ambiguities, the North Dakota version of the 
U.C.C. may be supplemented by the “general principles of law and equity, 
unless specifically displaced by the Code.”235 
Parties may opt to insert a NOM clause into their agreement.  It allows 
a party to decide, ahead of time, that subsequent agreements that are not 
written and signed will not be effective modifications of the original 
agreement.  However, there are decisions that apply similar reasoning to 
CX Digital’s line of reasoning, allowing for waiver of the NOM clause by 
course of performance and then, allowing for subsequent oral modification.  
In North Dakota, law has defined waiver as the “voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment and abandonment of a known existing rights, advantage, 
benefit, claim, or privilege which, except for such waiver, the party would 
have enjoyed.  Although, closely related to estoppel, waiver is a somewhat 
different concept.”236  If the lawyer combines the NOM clause with a 
merger clause, the effect may be to restrict the parties to the terms of only 
one document at a time.  This restricts the flexibility and ability for the 
parties to function rapidly.  They are bound to the original contract.237 
Bottom line, however, the U.C.C. and its ambiguities do not create 
unavoidable obstacles for the contracting parties.  The U.C.C. provisions, 
including in Article 2, represent the default rule.  The parties may modify 
the default rules through agreement, express and implied.238 Accordingly, 
courts and parties should view the U.C.C. mostly as a collection of default 
rules.239  In the rapid business of situations like western North Dakota’s 
boom town, it is important that the parties may modify the default rules of 
the U.C.C.  The U.C.C. “specifically allows the parties by contract to 
change most of its rules. Section 1-102(3) states:  ‘The effect of provisions 
 
234. 1 MORTON MOSKIN ET AL., COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS:  STRATEGIES FOR DRAFTING 
AND NEGOTIATING § 9.02, at 9-4 (2013); see also Maggs, supra note 27, at 120. 
235. Farmers Elevator Co. of Reserve v. Anderson, 552 P.2d 63, 65 (1976) (citations 
omitted). 
236. Stenehjem v. Sette, 240 N.W.2d 596, 600-01 (1976). 
237. Newell, supra note 30, at 498-99. 
238. Maggs, supra note 27, at 99. 
Nothing in section 1-103(2), however, suggests that parties may change the default 
rules only by express agreement.  Accordingly, courts should consider whether the 
facts of the particular transaction suggest that the parties implicitly agreed to create an 
exception.  Even if the parties do not say anything, their past course of dealing and the 
usage of the trade may show an agreement.  Section 1-205(3) says:  “A course of 
dealing between the parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which 
they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to 
and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.” 
Id. 
239. Id. at 118. 
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of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in 
this Act . . . .’”240  In general, because parties may modify the default rules 
of the U.C.C. by private agreement, the decisions of the court in the context 
of the U.C.C. analysis may not have as great an impact.  In other words, if 
parties do not like a U.C.C. default rule or a decision by the court, the 
parties are free to modify it.241  In turn, those agreements may be modified 
or provisions waived.242 
Counsel for the parties may seek, despite decisions such as the CX 
Digital decision that find for waiver, to contract away the possible waiver 
or modification.  The parties may attempt to accomplish this by inserting 
additional language into the agreement after a NOM clause to specifically 
exclude instant message exchanges from modifying the original contract, or 
constituting a waiver of terms in the original contract.  Another effort that 
lawyers may attempt, after the CX Digital decision, is to provide a clause in 
the instant message that the instant message shall not be construed as 
binding upon the sender-party.  Once again, this restricts the flexibility and 
ability of the parties to function rapidly in the business environment.  Some 
reliability is to be gained in these efforts.  An important consideration for 
this analysis is the way business parties usually conduct themselves, 
especially in a fast-paced environment.  Like the parties in CX Digital, 
parties may not be aware or attentive to the NOM clause (or similar 
language) or choose to ignore it.  If the parties are aware of the impact of 
these binding clauses, the parties may continue their business development, 
attempting to modify the agreement but, in explicit terms, violate it.  This is 
also especially true of just a NOM clause.  When the NOM is stuck into the 
boilerplate, where they often find themselves, the parties may not even look 
to the small print in the boiler plate and know it is there.243 
In the context of a rapidly developing business environment, the parties 
may know, or should know of the NOM clause and language in the instant 
message, but the fast pace of the business environment dissuades the parties 
from spending the time and figuring out what a writing would require.  
While this may frustrate counsel, this often happens in rapidly changing 
business when the requirements created by law, in the minds of the 
businessmen, clog the development of the business.  The interactions 
between the parties may modify or waive the underlying agreement, either 
 
240. Id. at 117. 
241. Id. at 83-84. 
242. Stenehjem v. Sette, 240 N.W.2d 596, 600 (1976). 
243. Newell, supra note 30, at 499-500. 
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by express or implied agreement.244  This is consistent with the legislative 
intent of the U.C.C.  If waiver or modification were not recognized by 
course of performance, parties would either be hesitant to or refrain from, 
for example, asking for a little accommodation.  The other alternative is 
they conduct themselves as if the NOM or the instant message clause did 
not exist and, if problems arise, then consult counsel.  Therefore, instead of 
expressly altering the default rules of the U.C.C., the parties may have 
impliedly modified the default rules.245 
With the drafting of the U.C.C., the legislature intended to reflect 
business practices and, therefore, allow “necessary and desirable 
modifications of sale contracts without regard to the technicalities which, at 
common law, hamper such adjustments.”246  The CX Digital decision, while 
not about Article 2, tracks the legislative intent of the drafters of the U.C.C. 
by reaching a decision that endeavors to reflect the realities of the business 
environment and can be used to supplement the provisions of the U.C.C.  
An analysis should proceed that reflects the notion that both parties have 
the opportunity in modification to receive more than they bargained for in 
the original contract.247  As a result, the analysis will need to evaluate, as 
the CX Decision performed, the business circumstances for the possible 
modification and not merely, in the case of sale of goods, a strict reading of 
the statute, to determine the voluntariness of the transaction.248  The drafters 
of the U.C.C. intended that the U.C.C. provide flexibility and allow 
business to flow without trappings getting in the way of business through 
contract adjustments.  Contract modification, like the CX Digital decision, 
should provide the reliability and flexibility to permit business to move 
forward even at boom town speed.  Consequently, the contracting and the 
lawyers involved will have to adapt and similarly provide the reliability and 
flexibility, including educating their clients about the possible effects of 
instant message exchanges and being educated by their clients as to their 
needs in boom town development. 
“Strap on your seatbelts . . . .  Here we go.”249 
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245. Id. at 83, 99, 100. 
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